Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs play an essential role in many cryptographic protocols. We suggest several NIZK proof systems based on prime order groups with a bilinear map. We obtain linear size proofs for relations among group elements without going through an expensive reduction to an NP-complete language such as Circuit Satisfiability. Security of all our constructions is based on the decisional linear assumption.
Introduction
A non-interactive proof system allows a prover to convince a verifier about the truth of a statement. Zeroknowledge captures the notion that the verifier learns no more from the proof than the truth of the statement. We refer to Section 2 for formal definitions of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs. NIZK proofs play a central role in the field of cryptography. Our goal in this paper is to construct short efficient prover NIZK proofs for languages that come up in practice when constructing cryptographic protocols. As an example of the usefulness of these new techniques, we construct group signatures consisting of a constant number of group elements.
Setup
We use two cyclic groups G, G 1 of order p, where p is a prime. We make use of a bilinear map e : G×G → G 1 . I.e., for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z we have e(u a , v b ) = e(u, v) ab . We require that e(g, g) is a generator of G 1 if g is a generator of G. We also require that group operations, group membership, and the bilinear map be efficiently computable. Such groups have been widely used in cryptography in recent years.
Let G be an algorithm that takes a security parameter as input and outputs (p, G, G 1 , e, g) such that p is prime, G, G 1 are descriptions of groups of order p, e : G × G → G 1 is an admissible bilinear map as described above and g is a random generator of G.
We use the decisional linear assumption introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04] .
Definition 1 (Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN)) We say the decisional linear assumption holds for the bilinear group generator G if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have
Pr (p, G, G 1 , e, g) ← G(1 k ); x, y, r, s ← Z p : A(p, G, G 1 , e, g, g x , g y , g xr , g ys , g r+s ) = 1 ≈ Pr (p, G, G 1 , e, g) ← G(1 k ); x, y, r, s, d ← Z p : A(p, G, G 1 , e, g, g x , g y , g xr , g ys , g d ) = 1 .
Throughout the paper, we work over a bilinear group (p, G, G 1 , e, g) ← G(1 k ) generated such that the DLIN assumption holds for G. We call this a DLIN group. Honest parties always check group membership of G, G 1 when relevant and halt if an element does not belong to a group that it was supposed to according to the protocol. Given a DLIN group (p, G, G 1 , e, g) we can set up a semantically secure cryptosystem as in [BBS04] . We choose at random x, y ← Z * p . The public key is (f, h), where f = g x , h = g y , and the secret key is (x, y). To encrypt a message m ∈ G we choose r, s ← Z p and let the ciphertext be (u, v, w) = (f r , h s , g r+s m). To decrypt a ciphertext (u, v, w) ∈ G 3 we compute m = D(u, v, w) = u −1/x v −1/y w.
The cryptosystem (K cpa , E, D) has several nice properties. The DLIN assumption for G implies semantic security under chosen plaintext attack (CPA). All triples (u, v, w) ∈ G 3 are valid ciphertexts. Also, the cryptosystem is homomorphic in the sense that E(m 1 ; r 1 , s 1 )E(m 2 , r 2 , s 2 ) = E(m 1 m 2 ; r 1 + r 2 , s 1 + s 2 ).
Given a group (p, G, G 1 , e, g) we define a pairing product equation of length over variables a 1 , . . . , a n to be an equation of the following form. Given a set S of pairing product equations eq 1 , . . . , eq m we can ask the natural question: Is there a tuple (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ G n such that all equations in S are simultaneously satisfied?
To illustrate the generality of the language of satisfiable pairing product equations we observe a reduction from the NP-complete language Circuit Satisfiability. Let a 1 , . . . , a n correspond to the wires of the circuit, which without loss of generality contains only NAND-gates. Let S contain equations e(a i , a i g −1 ) = 1 forcing each a i = g b i to encode a bit b i ∈ {0, 1}. For each NAND-gate with input wires i 0 , i 1 and output i 2 add to S the equation e(a i 0 , a i 1 ) = e(g, ga Our main motivation for being interested in satisfiability of pairing product equations is not NPcompleteness though. Satisfiability of pairing product equations comes up in practice when constructing cryptographic protocols and by making a direct NIZK proof instead of first reducing the problem to some other language such as Circuit Satisfiability we keep proofs short.
For concreteness, let us use verifiable encryption as an example of a pairing product satisfiability question that may come up in practice. Suppose (u, v, w) is a ciphertext under the public key (f, h) of the DLIN-based cryptosystem described earlier. We are interested in whether this ciphertext encrypts a particular message m. This is the case, if and only if there exists a such that e(g, u) = e(a, f ) and e(h, wm −1 a −1 )) = e(v, g). If we know r, s we can compute the satisfiability witness a = g r .
NIZK Proofs for Satisfiability of Pairing Product Equations
NIZK PROOFS. The central technical contribution of this paper is an NIZK proof of size O(n + ) group elements for satisfiability of a set of pairing product equations of combined length = m j=1 j . The proof system has perfect completeness and perfect soundness.
RELATED WORK ON NIZK PROOFS. NIZK proofs were introduced by Blum, Feldman and Micali [BFM88] and they suggested an NIZK proof for a single statement based on the hardness of deciding quadratic residousity. Blum et al. [BDMP91] extended this to multi-theorem NIZK proofs. Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS99] and Kilian and Petrank [KP98] give constructions based on trapdoor permutations.
Recently Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06b] have constructed NIZK proofs from composite order bilinear groups introduced by Boneh, Goh and Nissim [BGN05] . Even more recently Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06a] have introduced the setting in this paper, a bilinear group of prime order and the DLIN assumption. They construct non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs without any setup assumptions. In the common reference string (CRS) model both results give NIZK proofs for Circuit Satisfiability of size O(|C|) group elements.
All the above-mentioned papers have in common that they focus on an NP-complete language, usually Circuit Satisfiability, and suggest a bit-by-bit or gate-by-gate NIZK proof for this language. Our paper differs by introducing new techniques that allows making direct NIZK proofs for satisfiability of pairing product equations. This allows us to construct constant/linear size cryptographic protocols for digital signatures, RCCA-secure encryption [CKN03] , verifiable encryption and group signatures.
The only other way we know of to get linear size NIZK proofs/arguments for any practical language is the Fiat-Shamir heuristic: Make a 3-move public coin (honest verifier) zero-knowledge protocol noninteractive by computing the verifier's challenge as a hash of the statement and the initial protocol message. To argue security, one models the hash-function as a random oracle [BR93] . It is well known that using the random oracle model sometimes results in insecure real life protocols [CGH98, CGH04, Nie02, GK03, BBP04] . In comparison, our NIZK proofs have provable security under the DLIN assumption.
SIMULATION-SOUND EXTRACTABLE NIZK PROOFS. Combining the definitions of simulationsoundness introduced by Sahai [Sah01] and proofs of knowledge from De Santis and Persiano [DP92] , we get simulation-sound extractability. Here the simulator first creates a simulated CRS together with a simulation trapdoor and an extraction trapdoor. We require that even after the adversary has seen simulated proofs on arbitrary statements, if it constructs a new valid proof on any statement, then we can extract a witness. Simulation-sound extractability is a very strong notion, in particular it implies non-malleability as defined by De Santis et al. [DDO + 02] .
We construct a simulation-sound extractable NIZK proof for satisfiability of pairing product equations. Our NIZK proof has a CRS with a description of the group and a constant number of group elements, and the proofs consist of O(n + ) group elements.
RELATED WORK ON SIMULATION-SOUND NIZK PROOFS. As stated before, our interest in this paper is satisfiability of pairing products equations. However, in order to compare our scheme with previous work let us look at the case of Circuit Satisfiability. [Sah01] constructed a one-time simulation-sound NIZK proof system using techniques from Dwork, Dolev and Naor [DDN00] . Later a construction for unbounded simulation-sound extractable NIZK arguments was given by [DDO + 02], where the adversary can see many simulated arguments of arbitrary statements. The schemes from both these papers are based on trapdoor permutations but are not practical. For the sake of fairness in evaluating the quality of our contribution, we have also considered whether the techniques from [GOS06b] could be used to get good efficiency for simulation-sound extractability. The answer to this question seems to be negative, the best construction we can think of using GOS-techniques gives an additive polynomial size overhead.
Scheme
NIZK proof bit size Assumption [DDO + 
02]
O(|C|poly(k)) Trapdoor permutations Potential use of [GOS06b] techniques O(|C|k + poly(k)) Subgroup decision This paper O(|C|k) DLIN Figure 1 : Comparison of simulation-sound extractable proofs for Circuit Satisfiability COMMON REFERENCE STRING VERSUS UNIFORM RANDOM STRING. We will construct NIZK proofs and simulation-sound extractable NIZK proofs in the common reference string model, where the prover and the verifier both have access to a CRS chosen according to some distribution. If this distribution is uniform at random we call it the uniform random string model. In some settings it is easier to work with a URS, for instance a URS can easily be jointly generated using multi-party computation techniques. Our NIZK proofs use a common reference string that contains a description of a bilinear group and a number of group elements. Depending on the group elements, the CRS will give either perfect soundness of perfect zero-knowledge. With overwhelming probability random group elements will lead to a perfect soundness CRS. Assuming that we can use a uniform random string to get a description of a DLIN group and a number of random group elements, we will therefore get NIZK proofs and simulation-sound NIZK proofs in the URS-model. Since there is a negligible chance of picking a perfect zero-knowledge CRS, this gives statistical soundness instead of perfect soundness, which is the best we can hope for in the URSmodel. We remark that natural candidates for bilinear DLIN groups based on elliptic curves are efficiently samplable from a URS [GOS06a] . For the sake of simplicity we will just work with the CRS-model in the paper, but invite the reader to note that all constructions work in the URS-model as well.
[BSZ05] extend the security model to the partially dynamic case where the group manager can enroll new members in the group. Both [BMW03] and [BSZ05] suggest constructions of group signatures based on trapdoor permutations. These constructions are very inefficient and only indicate feasability.
Boyen and Waters [BW06] use a combination of the Waters signature scheme [Wat05] and the [GOS06b] NIZK proofs. They assume a static setting and as part of a group signature they encrypt the identity of the signer bit by bit. This means that a group signature consists of O(log n) group elements, where n is the number of members in the group. The group signature scheme satisfies a relaxed version of the [BMW03] security definition, where the anonymity is guaranteed only when no signatures have been opened and traced to the signer. In comparison, the full-anonymity definition in [BMW03] demands that anonymity is preserved even when the adversary can get an opening of any other signature than the challenge.
Ateniese et al. [ACHdM05] use a bilinear group of prime order. The advantage of this scheme is that it is very efficient, a group signature consists of 8 group elements. However, they use several strong security assumptions and their security model is even weaker than that of [BW06] since it does not protect against key-exposures; knowledge of a signing key immediately allows one to tell which signatures this member has made. In comparison, the BMW,BSZ-models do guard against key exposure.
The tools in this paper give a construction of group signatures where both keys and signatures consist of a constant number of group elements. The construction involves carefully constructing and tailoring a signature scheme and the simulation-sound extractable NIZK proof system such that they fit each other. The constant is large; we do not claim this to be a practical scheme. Rather this should be seen as an interesting feasibility result; under a simple and natural security assumption there exists an up to a constant optimal dynamic group signature scheme satisfying the strong security definitions from [BMW03, BSZ05] .
Scheme
Signature in bits Security model Assumption [BMW03] poly(k) Let R be an efficiently computable binary relation. For pairs (x, w) ∈ R we call x the statement and w the witness. Let L be the language consisting of statements in R.
A proof system for a relation R consists of a key generation algorithm K, a prover P and a verifier V . The key generation algorithm produces a CRS σ. The prover takes as input (σ, x, w) and produces a proof π. The verifier takes as input (σ, x, π) and outputs 1 if the proof is acceptable and 0 if rejecting the proof. We call (K, P, V ) a proof system for R if it has the completeness and soundness properties described below.
In this paper, we will extend the usual definitions of NIZK proofs by allowing the relation R to depend on the CRS σ. In our constructions, the CRS will contain a description of a bilinear group as well as some group elements, and we will make NIZK proofs for relations over this group and these group elements. This all builds up to an NIZK proof for satisfiability of pairing product equations. The relation for satisfiability of pairing product equations does not depend on the group elements in the CRS, but it still depends on the group in question. One way of looking at this result is that given a DLIN group, we can formulate the problem of satisfiability of pairing product equations, and we can on top of this group construct a CRS so we can prove satisfiability of pairing product equations. PERFECT COMPLETENESS. For all adversaries A we have
PERFECT SOUNDNESS. For all adversaries A we have
PERFECT KNOWLEDGE EXTRACTION. We call (K, P, V ) a proof of knowledge for R if there exists a knowledge extractor E = (E 1 , E 2 ) with the properties described below. For all adversaries A we have
For all adversaries A we have
(UNBOUNDED) COMPUTATIONAL ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. We call (K, P, V ) an NIZK proof for R if there exists a polynomial time simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) with the following zero-knowledge property. For all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have
where S(σ, τ, x, w) = S 2 (σ, τ, x) for (x, w) ∈ R and both oracles output failure if (x, w) / ∈ R. Here f (k) ≈ g(k) means that there exists a negligible function ν so |f (k) − g(k)| < ν(k). (UNBOUNDED) SIMULATION SOUNDNESS. Simulating a proof for a false statement might jeopardize the soundness of the proof system. We say an NIZK proof is simulation sound if an adversary cannot prove any false statement even after seeing simulated proofs of arbitrary statements.
More precisely, an NIZK proof is simulation sound if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries we have
where Q is the list of simulation queries and responses (x i , π i ).
(UNBOUNDED) SIMULATION SOUND EXTRACTABILITY. Combining simulation soundness and knowledge extraction, we may require that even after seeing many simulated proofs, whenever the adversary makes a new proof we are able to extract a witness. We call this property simulation sound extractability. Simulation sound extractability implies simulation soundness, because if we can extract a witness from the adversary's proof, then obviously the statement must belong to the language in question.
Consider an NIZK proof of knowledge (K, P, V, S 1 , S 2 , E 1 , E 2 ). Let SE 1 be an algorithm that outputs (σ, τ, ξ) such that it is identical to S 1 when restricted to the first two parts (σ, τ ). We say the NIZK proof is simulation sound if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries we have
where Q is the list of simulation queries and responses (x i , π i ). 1 Simulation sound extractability implies non-malleability as defined and proven in [DDO + 02]. As we shall see in Appendix 6.1 it also implies universally composable NIZK secure against adaptive adversaries in a model where we allow parties to erase data from their tapes. COMPOSABLE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE. We will strengthen the definition of zero-knowledge in the following way. First, we require that an adversary cannot distinguish a real CRS from a simulated CRS. Second, we require that the adversary, even when it gets access to the secret key τ , cannot distinguish real proofs on a simulated CRS from simulated proofs. A hybrid argument shows that it is sufficient to require that A cannot distinguish one real proof from one simulated proof.
Reference string indistinguishability. For all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have
Simulation indistinguishability. For all non-uniform interactive polynomial time adversaries A we have
In [DDO + 02] reference indistinguishability is also separated from simulation indistinguishability. They require the simulated CRS to be statistically indistinguishable from a real CRS, whereas we are satisfied with computational indistinguishability. This is necessary to obtain NIZK proofs, their schemes are arguments that are only secure against a polynomial time prover.
On the other hand, our definition of simulation indistinguishability is stronger than the definition in [DDO + 02]. We allow the adversary to see the simulation trapdoor τ , whereas they do not give the adversary such power.
Theorem 2 If
is a proof system with composable zero-knowledge, then it is unbounded zero-knowledge.
Proof. Reference string indistinguishability implies
by the indistinguishability of the reference strings, since A can simply run the prover itself. Let q(k) be an upper bound on the number of queries A can ask the oracle, i.e., let for instance q(k) be the run-time of A. Define P S[i](σ, τ, ·, ·) to be an oracle that on query j ∈ 1, . . . , q(k) with a valid pair (x, w) ∈ R responds with S 2 (σ, τ, x) if j ≤ i and
is not unbounded zero-knowledge, then for some 0 ≤ i < q(k) the adversary must be able to distinguish
To conclude the proof, we observe that simulation indistinguishability implies that for all i we have
since the oracles can be efficiently implemented if one knows σ, τ and inserts the challenge π as the answer to query i.
Our motivation for introducing this stronger notion of zero-knowledge is that it allows different zeroknowledge proofs to use the same CRS. Suppose we have relations R 1 , . . . , R n and corresponding NIZK proofs with composable zero-knowledge using the same key generator and CRS simulator K, S 1 . A hybrid argument shows that no polynomial time adversary can distinguish real proofs or simulated proofs for relation R i , even if it sees arbitrary proofs or simulations for statements in L j =i using the same CRS. The reason this is the case is that in the definition of simulation indistinguishability we give τ to the adversary, so it can itself implement the simulator S 2 for any of the relations.
In our paper, all the NIZK proofs will indeed generate the CRS in the same way and also simulate the CRS in the same way, so we get better performance by not having to deal with different common reference strings for each proof system. At the same time, it simplifies our exposition.
A Homomorphic Commitment Scheme
We use the cryptosystem from Section 1.1 to create a homomorphic commitment scheme such that depending on how we generate the public key we get either a perfectly binding commitment scheme or a perfectly hiding trapdoor commitment scheme. The idea is that if K is an encryption of 1, then K m E(1; r, s) is also an encryption of 1 and we have a perfectly hiding commitment to m. On the other hand, if K is not an encryption of 1, then K m E(1; r, s) is perfectly binding.
Perfectly binding key generation:
Let ck = (p, G, G 1 , e, g, f, h, u, v, w) where f, h is a public key for the cryptosystem and (u, v, w) = (f ru , h sv , g tw ) with t w = r u + s v is an encryption of a non-trivial element.
Perfectly hiding trapdoor key generation: Let ck = (p, G, G 1 , e, g, f, h, u, v, w) where f, h is a public key for the cryptosystem and (u, v, w) = (f ru , h sv , g ru+sv ) is an encryption of 1.
The corresponding trapdoor key is tk = (ck, x, y, r u , s v ).
Commitment:
To commit to message m ∈ Z p pick r, s ← Z p and let the commitment be c = (
The commitment schemes (K binding , com) and (K hiding , com) have several nice properties. The CPAsecurity of the cryptosystem implies that one cannot distinguish perfect binding keys from perfect hiding keys. This in turn implies computational hiding respectively computational binding for the two schemes. The homomorphic property of the cryptosystem transfers to the commitment scheme.
For the perfectly binding commitment scheme, any c ∈ G 3 is a commitment to some message m ∈ Z p .
Efficient Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

Common Reference String
All our NIZK proof systems will use the same key generator K and reference string simulator S 1 described below. A common reference string is a public key for the perfectly binding commitment scheme described in the previous section. The soundness of the NIZK proofs will come from the perfect binding property of the commitment scheme, which will make it impossible for any adversary to cheat. In simulations, we will use a public key for a perfectly hiding commitment scheme as the simulated common reference string. Here the perfect hiding property of the commitment scheme is what enables us to simulate proofs.
Common reference string:
Reference string indistinguishability follows from the semantic security of the cryptosystem, which implies that no non-uniform polynomial time adversary can distinguish a perfectly binding ck from a perfectly hiding ck.
Lemma 3 If
) is a DLIN group, then (K, S 1 ) has reference string indistinguishability.
A consequence of Lemma 3 is that in the rest of the paper we only need to prove simulation indistinguishability to prove composable zero-knowledge.
Both the common reference string generator K and the common reference string simulator S 1 first create a DLIN group honestly. This means that instead of generating the common reference strings from scratch, it is also possible to build any of the NIZK proofs we construct in the following sections on top of an already existing DLIN group. When doing so we write
NIZK Proof for Commitment to Zero
The common reference string contains a public key for a commitment scheme. As a first step we suggest an NIZK proof for a commitment containing 0. Given the reference string σ = (p, G, G 1 , e, g, f, h, u, v, w) we define R zero to be the relation consisting of commitments to 0, using the randomness as the witness. In other words, R zero = {(c, (r, s)) | c = com(0; r, s)}. We construct an NIZK proof for R zero below.
Simulation of proof:
Given input (σ, τ, (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 )) the simulator S zero generates the simulated proof π = c 
Proof.
Perfect completeness: A commitment (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) to 0 uniquely define r, s so c 1 = f r , c 2 = h s , c 3 = g r+s . We have e(g, c 1 ) = e(g, f r ) = e(g r , f ) = e(π, f ) and e(c 2 , g) = e(h s , g) = e(h, g s ) = e(h, c 3 /π).
Perfect soundness: Given a commitment (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) and an acceptable proof π, we have e(g, c 1 ) = e(π, f ) showing us that there exists some r such that c 1 = f r , π = g r . There also exists some s such that c 2 = h s . The second equation, e(c 2 , g) = e(h, c 3 /π) reveals e(h s , g) = e(h, g s ) = e(h, c 3 /π), showing that c 3 = g r+s . This means,
Composable zero-knowledge: We already have reference string indistinguishability, so all we need to prove is simulation indistinguishability. We have
since both computations yield the same uniquely defined π that will make the verifier accept the proof.
NIZK Proof for Commitment to Exponent.
Suppose, we have two elements a, b and a commitment c to the exponent m so b = a m . We wish to form an NIZK proof for
The idea in the proof is straightforward. If a = 1 then one can use the bilinear map to verify that a pair of commitments π 1 , π m have the same exponent m so π m = π m 1 . If π 1 is a commitment to 1, then π m is a commitment to m. What remains is to prove that π 1 com(−1; 0, 0) and c m π −1 m are commitments to 0. If a = b = 1, then the relation is trivially satisfied. However, later on we will be working on committed elements and it will not be straightforward to check whether an element is non-trivial. We therefore treat a = 1 as a special case and create an NIZK proof that works with the same verifier as for the a = 1 case.
Proof of commitment to exponent: Given common inputs a, b, c and a witness (m, r, s) the prover constructs the proof π as follows. Composable zero-knowledge: Let us show that on a simulated common reference string, proofs and simulated proofs are perfectly indistinguishable. Observe first that on a simulated common reference string all valid commitments are on the form f r 1 , h s 1 , g r 1 +s 1 . If a = 1, we pick r 1 , s 1 at random and use them to generate two random commitments π 1 , π m such that π m = π m 1 . So far, this gives us the same distribution as if they were generated by the prover. We conclude by noting that the NIZK proof for R zero has perfect simulation of proofs on a simulated common reference string. If a = 1 the perfect simulation indistinguishability of the NIZK proof for R zero also gives us a perfect simulation.
NIZK Proof for Pedersen Commitment
Consider a Pedersen commitment b = a m g t to m. We wish to make commitments to the opening m, t and make an NIZK proof that we have done so. In other words, we want an NIZK proof for
The idea in the NIZK proof is as follows. We write
for randomly chosen r 1 , r 2 , r, s. We reveal a r 1 , a r 2 and make commitments π r 1 , π r 2 to r 1 , r 2 . Using the NIZK proof for R expo , we can prove they have been correctly formed. We reveal (a r 1 g) r , (a r 2 g) s and create commitments π r,r 1 = π r r 1 , π s,r 2 = π s r 2 . Using the bilinear map the verifier can check that the exponentiation is correct, so they contain rr 1 and sr 2 . Using the homomorphic property, we have c m π r,r 1 π s,r 2 is a commitment to the exponent m+r 1 r +r 2 s. We also make commitments π r,1 , π s,1 to r and s and prove they have been correctly formed. By the homomorphic property, we have that c t π r,1 π s,1 is a commitment to r + s + t. Revealing g r+s+t indirectly also reveals a m+r 1 r+r 2 s = b(a r 1 g) r (a r 2 g) s g −(r+s+t) . Using NIZK proofs for R expo we can prove it has been correctly formed. This demonstrates that b = a m g t as required. Computational zero-knowledge will follow from the DLIN assumption, since g r+s looks random given (a r 1 g) r and (a r 2 g) s and therefore in the simulation we can pick it a random exponent d instead of using r + s.
Proof for Pedersen commitment:
The prover gets a statement (a, b, c m , c t ) and a witness (m, t, r m , s m , r t , s t ) as input. The proof is constructed as follows
The proof is π = (π a,1 , . . . , π πa ).
Verification:
On common input a, b, c m , c t and proof π do 1. Verify the NIZK proofs π π 1,1 , π π 1,2 , π π 0 for π 1,1 , π 1,2 being commitments to 1 and c t π r,1 π s,1 π −1 t,1 being a commitment to 0 2. Verify the NIZK proof π πr 1 for the existence of some r 1 so π a,1 = a r 1 and π r 1 being a commitment to r 1 3. Verify the NIZK proof π πr 2 for the existence of some r 2 so π a,2 = a r 2 and π r 2 being a commitment to r 2 4. Verify the NIZK proof π πa for the existence of some z so bπ r π s π −1 t = a z and c m π r,r 1 π s,r 2 being a commitment to z. 
The simulated proof is π = (π a,1 , . . . , π πa ) 
Proof.
Perfect completeness: Follows from the perfect completeness of (K, P zero , V zero ) and (K, P expo , V expo ).
Perfect soundness:
From the perfect soundness of (K, P zero , V zero ) we get π 1,1 , π 1,2 contain 1 and
t,1 contains 0. This means π r,1 is a commitment to r and π s,1 is a commitment to s, and consequently π t,1 is a commitment to r + s + t. This in turn means that π t = g r+s+t .
From the perfect soundness of (K, P expo , V expo ) we see that there exists r 1 , r 2 so π a,1 = a r 1 and π a,2 = a r 2 , and at the same time π r 1 is a commitment to r 1 and π r 2 is a commitment to r 2 . This means, c m π r,r 1 π s,r 2 contains m + rr 1 + sr 2 .
From π πa we get
Composable zero-knowledge: The polynomial time adversary A(σ, τ ) produces a statement (a, b, c m , c t ) and a witness (m, t, r m , s m , r t , s t ). We now have to argue it cannot distinguish a proof from P ped from a simulated proof from S ped .
By the composable zero-knowledge properties of the NIZK proofs for R zero and R expo we can simulate the proofs π π 1,1 , . . . , π πa without A being able to distinguish.
In case a = 1 straightforward verification shows that on a simulated reference string, proofs and simulated proofs are perfectly indistinguishable. This leaves the case where a = 1.
Let us start with the way a prover produces a proof. Since the commitments are perfectly hiding, we can select π 1,1 , π 1,2 , π r 1 and π r 2 as random commitments to 0. Since a is a generator for G, we get the same distribution if we select π a,1 = g α−1 and π a,2 = g β−1 for random α, β. With overwhelming probability α, β = 0 in which case r 3 , s 3 and αr 3 , αs 3 have the same distribution when picking r 3 , r 4 random. In a similar fashion, we change the randomizers of the other commitments to have α or β factors.
We have now modified the proof, such that the only difference from the simulation is that we select z = r + s + t, while in the simulation we pick z at random. We will show that if A can distinguish a simulated proof from a partially simulated proof, then we can use it to break the DLIN assumption for G.
Let g α , g β , g αr , g βs , g d be a DLIN challenge, where d = r + s or d is random. Since we know the discrete logarithms of f, h, u, v, w with respect to g, we can given
We can also given g α compute a random commitment by selecting r 3 , s 3 at random and letting the commitment be com(0; αr 3 , αs
Similar techniques explain how we compute the various commitments listed below.
Let us set π a,
We set π 1,1 = com(0; αr 3 , αs 3 ), π r = com(0; αrr 3 , αrs 3 ) and π 1,2 = com(0; βr 5 , s 5 ), π s = com(0; βsr 5 , βss 5 ). We set π r 1 = com(0; αr 4 , αs 4 ), π r,r 1 = com(0; αrr 4 , αrs 4 ) and π r 2 = com(0; βr 6 , βs 6 ), π s,r 2 = com(0; βsr 6 , βss 6 ). Finally, compute π t = g d g t .
In case, d = r + s then this gives us a partially simulated proof with z = r + s + t. In case d is random, this gives us a simulated proof with z random. If A could distinguish between partially simulated proofs and simulated proofs, then we would be able to break the DLIN assumption.
NIZK Proof for Multi-message Pedersen Commitment
Let us generalize the Pedersen commitment to a many messages b = g t n i=1 a m i i . We wish to make an NIZK proof for having committed to t, m 1 , . . . , m n so b is a multiexponentiation to these messages.
More precisely, we want an NIZK proof for the relation
The idea in this NIZK proof is to split b into n Pedersen commitments and use NIZK proof from the previous section. Write
where t = n i=1 t i , make commitments to the t i 's and make an NIZK proof for R ped for each of these components.
Proof for multi-message Pedersen commitment:
The prover gets a statement (a 1 , . . . , a n , b, c t , c 1 , . . . , c n ) and a witness (t, r t , s t , m 1 , r 1 , s 1 , . . . , m n , r n , s n ) as input. The proof is constructed as follows
The proof is π = (
Verification: On common input a 1 , . . . , a n , b, c t , c 1 , . . . , c n and proof π do
Verify the NIZK proofs π π 1 , . . . , π πn 3. Return 1 if all checks pass, else return 0
Simulation: Given common input (a 1 , . . . , a n , b, c t , c 1 , . . . , c n ) we simulate the proof as follows
The simulated proof is π = ( Proof.
Perfect completeness:
Follows from the perfect completeness of (K, P ped , V ped ).
Perfect soundness: From the perfect soundness of (K, P ped , V ped ) we know that c i , π t i are commitments to m i , t i so π i = a
as required.
Composable zero-knowledge: On a simulated reference string, the adversary cannot distinguish between proofs and simulated proofs π π 1 , . . . , π πn . Since the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding the adversary also cannot distinguish between commitments π t i ← com(t i ) and π t i ← com(0), where we in both cases fit π tn = c t
. The Pedersen commitment scheme is also perfectly hiding, so we cannot distinguish between picking π i = a m i i g t i and π i = g t i for random t i , where we fit
NIZK Proof for Multiplicative Relationship
Consider three commitments c a , c b , c c such that the corresponding messages have the relationship m c = m a m b . We wish to construct an NIZK proof for such a multiplicative relationship. More precisely, a composable NIZK proof for
If are commitments to 0. To get zero-knowledge, we want to somehow tweak this idea in a way such that m a is not revealed directly.
The main trick in the following is to pick exponents r, s at random, which will be used to hide m a . We want to prove are both commitments to 0. The only way this can be possible is when m a = t − r − s.
Computational zero-knowledge will follow from the fact that while we use the same exponents, we use different bases. Therefore, at no point is any element itself raised to m a , which the adversary could potentially use to detect whether it was a correct proof or one created by a simulator, which does not know m a .
Proof of multiplicative relationship:
The proof is π = (π 0,1 , . . . , π π 0,6 ). 2 Given n pairs (ai, bi) and the claim that ∃r∀i : bi = a r i it can be checked by picking some ai = 1 and check that for all j = i we have e(ai, bj) = e(bi, aj). In this particular case, where we claim ∃r : πr = (com(1; 0, 0)π0, 1) r and π r,b = (c b π0,2) r there are 6 pairs, so we can verify the claim using 10 pairings. Note that since we see an NIZK proof for π0,1 being a commitment to 0, we know that com(1; 0, 0)π0,1 has at least one non-trivial group element, so if the checks work out there is one uniquely defined exponent r. Later on, we will do the same operation on committed elements, where it is not straightforward to check whether some ai is non-trivial. We solve that by checking e(ai, bj) = e(bi, aj) for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, which corresponds to making 32 pairings.
The simulated proof is π = (π 0,1 , . . . , π π 0,6 ). 
Proof.
Perfect completeness: Follows from the perfect completeness of the NIZK proof for R zero .
Perfect soundness: Suppose A produces a statement (c a , c b , c c ) and a valid NIZK proof π.
From the verification, we learn that there exist r, s, t so Let us first look at the way P mult operates. Because (K, P zero , V zero , S 1 , S zero ) is composable zeroknowledge, we can use S zero to simulate π π 0,1 , . . . , π π 0,6 instead of using P zero to make them, without A being able to distinguish.
This partially simulated proof runs exactly as the simulator, except we have t = r + s + m a , whereas in the simulation t is random. We will show that if A(σ, τ ) can distinguish these two cases, then we can break the DLIN assumption for G. Let therefore g α , g β , g αr , g βs , g d be a DLIN challenge, where we wish to decide whether d = r + s or d is random.
Let us incorporate r, s from the challenge into the proof, such that distinguishing t = r + s + m a from t random corresponds to distinguishing between d = r + s and d random. Since we know τ , we know the discrete logarithms of f, h, u, v, w with respect to g. This means, given g d we can compute com(1; 0, 0
We also know the witness (m a , r a , s a , m b , r b , s b , r c , s c ) so we can compute
Given g α and r 1 , s 1 it is straightforward to compute the commitment
Similarly, we can compute the other elements in the following. 
The distribution of these values is statistically close to what a prover respectively simulator would produce on a simulated common reference string. With d = r + s, we have the case with t = r + s + m a , and with d random it corresponds to t random. If A can distinguish real proofs from simulated proofs, we can therefore distinguish between d = r + s and d random in the DLIN challenge.
NIZK Proof for Committed Bilinear Product
Consider elements a 1 , b 1 , . . . , a n , b n ∈ G such that
Suppose we have committed to a i , b i in the following way.
We have A i = g r i a i , B i = g s i b i and commitments to r i , s i and wish to make an NIZK proof for
More precisely, we want to make an NIZK proof for the following relation: R bil−prod = { (A 1 , c r 1 , B 1 , c s 1 , . . . , A n , c rn , B n , c sn ), (r 1 , r r 1 , s r 1 , s 1 , r s 1 , s s 1 , . . . , r n , r rn , s rn , s n , r sn , s sn )
if and only if n i=1 e(a i , b i ) = 1. In the NIZK proof, we pick R 1 , S 1 , . . . , R n , S n at random, their role is to give us zero-knowledge. We commit to R i , S i and we already have commitments to r i , s i . We reveal the 2n + 1 ele-
i . We then use NIZK proofs for R expo , R mult , R m−ped to prove that these elements have been formed correctly.
In the simulation, we observe that for arbitrary R 1 , S 1 , . . . , R n , S n we have
Picking R 1 , S 1 , . . . , R n , S n at random means that all elements have the same distribution as in a real proof. We can then simulate the NIZK proofs for R expo , R mult , R m−ped .
Proof for committed bilinear product: P bil−prod (σ, (A 1 , c r 1 , B 1 , c s 1 , . . . , A n , c rn , B n , c sn ), (r 1 , r r 1 , s r 1 , s 1 , r s 1 , s s 1 , . . . , r n , r rn , s rn , s n , r sn , s sn )) does the following
The proof is π = (π R 1 , . . . , π π m−ped ).
Verification: V bil−prod (σ, (A 1 , c r 1 , B 1 , c s 1 , . . . , A n , c rn , B n , c sn ), π) does the following , (A 1 , c r 1 , B 1 , c s 1 , . . . , A n , c rn , B n , c sn ) ) does the following
12.
The simulated proof is π = (π R 1 , . . . , π π m−ped ).
Theorem 9 (K, P bil−prod , V bil−prod , S 1 , S bil−prod ) is an NIZK proof for R bil−prod with perfect completeness, perfect soundness and composable zero-knowledge under the DLIN assumption for G. Proofs consist of 228n − 3 group elements and verification corresponds to evaluating a set of pairing product equations.
Proof.
Perfect completeness: Perfect completeness follows from the perfect completeness of P mult , P expo , P m−ped .
Perfect soundness: From π π R i , π π S i we learn that there exists
From π π R i S i we learn that π R i S i is a commitment to R i S i . Likewise, π πr i s i is an NIZK proof that π r i s i contains r i s i , the product of the messages in c r i , c s i .
The proof π π m−ped shows that
we then have
Composable zero-knowledge: Because, the NIZK proofs for R mult , R expo and R ped are all composable zero-knowledge, we may modify the prover in such a way that we simulate all the NIZK proofs for these relations. The adversary A(σ, τ ) cannot distinguish such a partially simulated proof from a real one.
Since the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding, we can now make commitments to 0, whenever we make a commitment. This is perfectly indistinguishable from the partially simulated proof described above. The partially simulated proof contains random values π g R i , π g S i and π m−ped is the unique value so
. In the simulation, we also get completely random elements π g R i , π g S i and the unique element π m−ped such that the equation holds. Therefore, proofs and simulated proofs are computationally indistinguishable.
NIZK Proof for Satisfiability of Pairing Product Equations
In this section, we consider sets of pairing product equations over variables a 1 , . . . , a n . Let us first recall the definition in the introduction of a pairing product equation. By a pairing product equation, we mean an equation on the form eq(a 1 , . . . , a n ) : j=1 e(q j,0 , q j,1 ) = 1 , where
for known b j,b ∈ G and e j,b,i ∈ Z p . A set S of pairing product equations eq 1 , . . . , eq m is said to be satisfiable if there exists (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ G n such that all equations are satisfied.
Let R ppsat = { S | ∃(a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ G n ∀eq k ∈ S : eq k (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = true}. Using the NIZK proof for R bil−prod we can create an NIZK proof for R ppsat . The idea is straightforward, we first commit to each a i as g t i a i , com(t i ). Using homomorphic properties, it is straightforward for q k,j,b in equation
For each equation we can now carry out an NIZK proof for R bil−prod that k j=1 e(q k,j,0 , q k,j,1 ) = 1.
Proof for satisfiability of pairing product equations: On a set of pairing product equations eq 1 , . . . , eq m and witness a 1 , . . . , a n where eq k is the equation k j=1 e(q k,j,0 (a 1 , . . . , a n ), q k,j,1 (a 1 , . . . , a n )) = 1 with terms q k,j,b (a 1 , . . . , a n )
The proof is π = (π a 1 , π t 1 , . . . , π an , π tn , π 1 , . . . , π m ) Verification: Given the statement and proof π return 1 if and only if all proofs π 1 , . . . , π m are valid.
Simulation:
To simulate a proof do the following
.
The simulated proof is π = (π a 1 , π t 1 , . . . , π an , π tn , π 1 , . . . , π m ). 
Proof.
Perfect completeness: Perfect completeness follows from the perfect completeness of the NIZK proofs for R bil−prod .
Perfect soundness:
Since the commitments are perfectly binding, π t i contain a t i that uniquely defines an a i so π a i = g t i a i . Since the NIZK proofs for R bil−prod are perfectly sound, a 1 , . . . , a n is a satisfying assignment to the equations eq 1 , . . . , eq m .
Composable zero-knowledge:
On a simulated reference string, it is indistinguishable to the adversary whether it sees proofs or simulated proofs π 1 , . . . , π m . Since the commitment scheme is perfectly hiding on a simulated reference string, this implies simulation indistinguishability.
NESTING NIZK PROOFS. It is interesting to observe that verification of an NIZK proof for R ppsat itself consists of verifying a set of pairing product equations. This means that we can nest NIZK proofs, i.e., prove that there exists a proof such that there exists a proof, etc. Each level of nesting will cause a blowup by a constant factor. This is something that is much more expensive to do with other known NIZK proofs, and impossible to do in the random oracle model. REDUCING THE NUMBER OF VARIABLES. We will argue that if n > 2 then we can combine or remove some of the variables such that we get an equivalent set of equations over variables a 1 , . . . , a 2 . We have a total of 2 monomials q k,j,b /b k,j,b . We can represent each as a row-vector (e k,j,b,1 , . . . , e k,j,b,n ). Let M be an 2 × n matrix with these row-vectors. Let a = (log a 1 , . . . , log a n ) and q = (log(q 1,1,0 /b 1,1,0 ) , . . . , log(q m, m,1 /b m, m,1 )). We have M a = q. Since n > 2 , we can do column-reduction on M to get a matrix with at most 2 non-zero columns. This means there exists an invertible n × n transformation matrix T such that only the 2 left columns of M T are non-zero. We have (M T )(T −1 a) = q. Let a correspond to a satisfying assignment for the set of equations. Then a = T −1 a corresponds to a satisfying assignment for the set of pairing product equations given by M T . Note that given a 1 , . . . , a n it is straightforward to compute a 1 , . . . , a n . On the other hand, since T is invertible if there is no (a 1 , . . . , a n ) satisfying the equations, then there is no (a 1 , . . . , a n ) satisfying the equations given by representing the q k,j,b 's with the rows in M T . We now observe that since only the left 2 columns of M T are non-zero, we can ignore a 2 +1 , . . . , a n when considering satisfiability of the equations. Therefore, in practice we can always get by with 2 variables and the NIZK proof will consist of O( ) group elements.
PAIRING PRODUCT EQUATIONS FOR IDENTICAL PLAINTEXT. Here is another motivational example for being interested in satisfiability of pairing product equations that will be useful later on. Let (f 1 , h 1 ) and (f 2 , h 2 ) be two public keys for the cryptosystem described in Section 1.1. Let (u 1 , v 1 , w 1 ) and (u 2 , v 2 , w 2 ) be two ciphertexts. We are interested in the question whether they encrypt the same message m. The ciphertexts uniquely define m 1 , r 1 , s 1 and m 2 , r 2 , s 2 such that
Observe, m 1 = m 2 if and only if w 1 /w 2 = g r 1 +s 1 −r 2 −s 2 . Therefore, a 1 = g r 1 , a 2 = g s 1 , a 3 = g r 2 , a 4 = g s 2 is a witness for the two ciphertexts encrypting the same message. It is straightforward to use the bilinear map to check the pairing product equations e(g, u 1 ) = e(a 1 , f 1 ), e(g, v 1 ) = e(a 2 , h 1 ), e(g, u 2 ) = e(a 3 , f 2 ), e(g, v 2 ) = e(a 4 , h 2 ) and e(g, a 1 a 2 a 3 a 4 ) = e(g, w 1 w
where the latter equation implies w 1 /w 2 = g r 1 +s 1 −r 2 −s 2 .
DISJUNCTION OF SETS OF PAIRING PRODUCT EQUATIONS.
Suppose that we have L sets S 1 , . . . , S L of pairing product equations over a 1 , . . . , a n and want to argue that at least one of the sets is satisfiable. One can compile these sets of equations into one set S, which is satisfiable if and only if one of S 1 , . . . , S L is satisfiable. The compilation, which we describe below is witness preserving in the sense that a satisfying assignment for a set S l allows one to compute a satisfying assignment for S easily. We introduce variables a l,k,j , where l ≤ L, k ≤ m l , j ≤ l,k and also A 1 , . . . , A L . The role of A 1 , . . . , A L is to point to some set that is satisfiable. S will contain the equation e(g −1 L l=1 A l , g) = 1. This equation guarantees at least one A l = 1, indicating the satisfiable set. The prover can choose this A l = g, while the others can be 1. We add to S the set equations e(A l , a
These equations ensure that if A l = 1 then a l,k,j = q l,k,j,0 and if A l = 1, then we are free to choose a l,k,j = 1. Finally, add all the original equations from the sets S 1 , . . . , S L replacing q l,k,j,0 with a l,k,j . This construction works because for l, where A l = g 0 we have that all the variables representing q k,l,j,0 's are 1 so the equations in this set are satisfied. On the other hand, for the set S l where A l = 1 we have preserved the original equations. If the sets of pairing product equations S 1 , . . . , S L have combined length = L l=1 m l k=1 l,k , then the set S has length S = 1 + 2 and contains pairing product equations over n + L + variables.
Cryptographic Tools
A One-time Signature Scheme
Suppose we want to make a one-time signature on an element m ∈ G. The verification key will consist of a common reference string σ as well as two commitments c, c 1 to respectively z, z 1 . A signature on m is m z g z 1 and an NIZK proof that it has been correctly formed. The intuition behind this signature scheme is that even if an adversary sees one signature, there are still two unknowns z, z 1 so he cannot determine what a signature on another element should look like. We will extend this scheme in the natural way to sign multiple elements. n and (p, G, G 1 , e, g ) do 1. σ ← K(p, G, G, e, g) 2. z, z 1 , . . . , z n ← Z p 3. r z , s z , . . . , r zn , s zn ← Z p 4. c = com(z; r z , s z ) , . . . , c n = com(z n ; r zn , s zn )
Verification key: On input
The verification key is vk = (σ, c, c 1 , . . . , c n ) .
The signing key is sk = (vk, z, r z , s z , . . . , z n , r zn , s zn )
The signature is s = (s 1 , π 1 , . . . , s n , π n )
Verification:
To verify the signature s on message (m 1 , . . . , m n ) check the proofs π 1 , . . . , π n .
Theorem 11
Assuming (p, G, G 1 , e, g) the scheme (K ots , Sign, Ver) described above is a one-time signature scheme with perfect correctness. To sign n elements from G both the verification key and the signatures have O(n) group elements. We note that the verification procedure consists of evaluating a set of pairing product equations.
Proof. Perfect correctness follows from the perfect completeness of the NIZK proof for R ped . To argue existential unforgeability under a one-time chosen message attack consider the probability of an adversary creating a forged signature on m 1 , . . . , m n after seeing a signature on m 1 , . . . , m n . By the perfect soundness of the NIZK proof, the adversary must produce a signature on the form s 1 = m z 1 g z 1 , . . . , s n = m z n g zn . Let us change the key generation such that we simulate the common reference string and we simulate the NIZK proofs on the adversary's chosen message attack. A successful adversary must with overwhelming probability still produce a signature on m 1 , . . . , m n where s i = m z i g z i . Otherwise, we could break the unbounded zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof with the knowledge of z, z 1 , . . . , z n .
We are now in the simulation case, where the NIZK proofs are simulated. There are n + 1 unknowns z, z 1 , . . . , z n and in the chosen message attack the adversary may learn n equations (m 1 ) z g z 1 , . . . , (m n ) z g zn . This still leaves one unknown variable. The probability of the adversary producing the correct m z 1 g z 1 , . . . , m z n g zn is therefore negligible unless m 1 = m 1 , . . . , m n = m n .
RCCA-secure Public-Key Encryption
Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen [CKN03] suggest a useful relaxation of chosen ciphertext attack security. Informally, their notion captures the case where an adversary may be able to rerandomize a ciphertext such that it still has the same plaintext, however, in all other cases the cryptosystem is CCA-secure. They call this security against replayable chosen ciphertext (RCCA) attack.
Definition 12 (RCCA-security) A cryptosystem (K rcca , E, D) is RCCA-secure if for any non-uniform polynomial time adversary A we have
where
• It is clear that any CCA-secure cryptosystem is also RCCA-secure. [CKN03] show a separation, if CCA-secure cryptosystems exist then RCCA-secure cryptosystems that are not CCA-secure exist. On the other hand, it is also the case that if RCCA-secure cryptosystems exist, then CCA-secure cryptosystems exist.
We will suggest a public key cryptosystem, which is RCCA-secure. The construction resembles the constructions of CCA-secure encryption by Lindell [Lin03] , who builds on previous work by Naor and Yung [NY90] and Sahai [Sah01] . Since we only aim for RCCA-security, we can obtain a few simplifications though. We first present the general construction and then plug in our tools afterwards.
Public key generation:
To generate keys do 1. Generate two keys, (pk 1 , sk 1 ), (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← K cpa (1 k ), for a CPA-secure cryptosystem 2. Generate a key, ck ← K binding (1 k ), for a perfectly binding commitment scheme 3. Generate a key (vk , sk ) ← K ots (1 k ) for a one-time signature scheme 4. Let c vk = com ck (vk ; r) be a commitment to vk using randomness r 5. Generate a common reference string, σ ← K(1 k ), for an NIZK proof 3 The public key is pk = (pk 1 , pk 2 , ck, c vk , σ) and the secret key is sk = (pk, sk 1 ).
Encryption:
To encrypt a message m.
1. Pick randomness r 1 , r 2 and encrypt m twice as c 1 = E pk 1 (m; r 1 ), c 2 = E pk 2 (m; r 2 ) 2. Select a key (vk, sk) ← K ots (1 k ) for the one-time signature scheme 3. Sign c 1 , c 2 as s ← Sign sk (c 1 , c 2 ) (pk 1 , pk 2 , ck, c vk , c 1 , c 2 , vk), (m, r 1 , r 2 ) ). This is an NIZK proof for c 1 , c 2 containing the same plaintext or c vk containing vk, i.e., vk = vk.
The ciphertext is c = (c 1 , c 2 , vk, s, π)
Decryption: Verify the signature s and the proof π. If both are ok, return m = D sk 1 (c 1 ).
Theorem 13
The cryptosystem described above is RCCA-secure. 3 Zero-knowledge implies witness-indistinguishability, which is sufficient here.
Proof. In either experiment in the definition of RCCA-security if the adversary ever recycles the onetime signature verification key of the challenge in a decryption query with a valid signature s and a valid proof π, then with overwhelming probability it must also recycle c 1 , c 2 , since otherwise we would have a one-time signature forgery. We can therefore with only negligible change in success-probability for the adversary let the oracle answer test on any query with a valid (by valid we mean correct signature and correct proof) ciphertext reusing vk from the challenge. When making the challenge encryption we can pick vk as our one-time signature verification key. The hiding property of the commitment scheme ensures that the adversary's success probability only changes negligibly. In particular, the adversary does not use vk in any valid query to O 1 , and in case it uses it in a query to O 2 , then it recycles c 1 , c 2 from the challenge and we answer test.
We can now switch the witness we use in making the proof π. Instead of using (m b , r 1 , r 2 ) as the witness, we can use vk , r as the witness. The zero-knowledge property ensures that this does not change the adversary's success probability significantly.
We now have a situation where the adversary does not ask valid decryption queries using vk , and in the challenge we encrypt the message under both pk 1 , pk 2 and then make an NIZK proof using witness vk , r. We have to argue that in this setting the adversary cannot distinguish a challenge encryption of m 0 from a challenge encryption of m 1 .
Since the decryption key sk 2 is never used, the semantic security under chosen plaintext attack gives us that we can change c 2 to be an encryption of m 1 without the adversary noticing it.
Next, let us argue that we can switch from using sk 1 to using sk 2 when decrypting oracle queries. Remember, we already modified the oracle so that if vk is recycled in a valid query, then we answer test, and we don't need either decryption key. Consider any other decryption query, here vk = vk . Soundness of the NIZK proof implies that c 1 , c 2 in any valid query contain the same message. Using sk 1 or sk 2 therefore gives the same answer, and therefore the adversary cannot distinguish whether we use sk 1 or sk 2 for decryption.
We are now in a situation, where the decryption key sk 1 is never used. Semantic security under chosen plaintext attack therefore means that we can switch the plaintext of c 1 from m 0 to m 1 . We now have that in the challenge we encrypt m 1 in both c 1 and c 2 .
Since the soundness of the NIZK proof implies that in any valid query c 1 , c 2 contain the same plaintext, we can switch back to using sk 1 for decryption.
Let us suggest a concrete implementation of the above-mentioned scheme. We work over a DLIN group (p, G, G 1 , e, g) and wish to encrypt messages on the form m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ G n .
We pick x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 ← Z p at random and use f 1 = g x 1 , h 1 = g y 1 and f 2 = g x 2 , h 2 = g x 2 as two public keys for the CPA-secure cryptosystem described in Section 1.1. To encrypt a message m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ G n under either key, we simply encrypt m 1 , . . . , m n one by one.
To set up a perfectly binding commitment scheme, we pick yet another encryption key f c , h c . Commitment corresponds to encryption under this key.
We want to use the one-time signature scheme from the previous section. Let us consider how long the ciphertexts c 1 , c 2 can be. Suppose we want to encrypt tuples of messages (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ G n . The size of two ciphertexts will be 6n elements in G, so we will set up the one-time signature scheme such that we can sign messages consisting of 6n group elements. Such a one-time verification key will specify a common reference string σ vk = (f vk , h vk , u vk , v vk , w vk ) as well as the committed signing key c, c 1 , . . . , c 6n . We will therefore let c vk be the encryption of these 18n + 9 elements.
Finally, we need an NIZK proof for R sor = {((pk 1 , pk 1 , ck, c vk , c 1 , c 2 , vk), w) | (w = (r 1 , r 2 , m) : c 1 = E pk 1 (m; r 1 ), c 2 = E pk 2 (m; r 2 )) ∨ (w = r : c vk = com ck (vk; r))}. We have in Appendix 4.8 argued that there exists a set of pairing product equations that are satisfiable if and only if two ciphertexts encrypt the same message under their respective public keys. In the introduction, we described a set of pairing product equations corresponding to encryption of a particular message. In our case, this ciphertext is c vk , which has the plaintext vk = (f vk , . . . , c n ). Finally, we also argued in Appendix 4.8 that we can compile two sets of pairing product equations into one set corresponding to the statement that at least one of the original set of equations is satisfiable. We observe, given a witness in the form of plaintexts and randomness for c 1 , c 2 or vk and randomness for c vk one can actually find (a 1 , a 2 , . . .) to satisfy the set of pairing product equations. This shows that we can use the NIZK proof for R ppsat to implement an NIZK proof for R sor . With the choices above, the size of the NIZK proof will be O(n) group elements. If (p, G, G 1 , e, g) is a DLIN-group, we can built an RCCA-secure cryptosystem  (K rcca , E, D) . The cryptosystem permits encryption of messages on the form (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ G n . The cryptosystem has perfect decryption and perfect decryption verification as defined in the next section. The public key and the ciphertexts both consist of O(n) group elements. It is publicly verifiable whether the ciphertext is valid, and such verification corresponds to evaluating a set of pairing product equations.
Corollary 14
Kiltz [Kil06] has recently suggested a simple CCA2-secure cryptosystem based on the DLIN assumption. However, in his scheme verifying correctness of the ciphertext does not correspond to evaluating a set of pairing product equations. Since we will need this property later on, we use the more complicated construction above.
Signature Scheme Secure against Chosen Message Attack
In this section, we construct a signature scheme that is secure against chosen message attack. We first describe the signature scheme in general terms, then suggest a concrete implementation based on the DLIN assumption.
The signature scheme based on the DLIN assumption is not practical due to the large constant. Nonetheless, it does have independent interest since it is based on a simple cryptographic assumption and can be used to sign group elements m ∈ G. Other signature schemes such as Boneh and Boyen's [BB04] needs the message to be an exponent m ∈ Z p , which makes it hard to make proofs of knowledge for instance since we do not know how to compute discrete logarithms.
We will need three tools in the construction. One tool is an RCCA-secure cryptosystem 4 with decryption verification. By decryption verification, we mean that there should exist two algorithms W dec , V dec . The role of W dec is to convert the plaintext m and the randomness r for a ciphertext c = E pk (m; r) into a decryption witness w for D sk (c) = m. The role of V dec is to verify a witness w that indeed a ciphertext will decrypt to m. Formally, we require that for all adversaries A we have
Decryption verification implies that the cryptosystem has perfect decryption. On the other hand, for a cryptosystem with perfect decryption, we could simply let w = r and let the verification algorithm check whether c = E pk (m; w).
The second tool is a gap problem. By this we mean that we have a generator K gap that generates (a, b) and a verification algorithm V gap such that it is easy to verify (a, b) but hard to compute b from a. For all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have
It is easy to come up with examples of gap-problems, one could for instance let f be a one-way function, choose b at random and let a = f (b), which is easily verifiable. The third tool is an NIZK proof system for a ciphertext decrypting to m, b such that b is the hard part of a gap-problem. More precisely, we need a R encgap = { ((pk, a, m, c), (b, w) 
Key generation: To generate keys do
2. Generate keys for the RCCA-secure cryptosystem, (pk, sk rcca ) ← K rcca (1 k ) 3. Generate a common reference string for the NIZK proof system, σ ← K(1 k )
The verification key is vk = (pk, a, σ).
The signing key is sk = (vk, b).
Signing:
To sign a message m do pk, a, m, c), (b, w) ) for c decrypting to m and b such that V gap (a, b) = 1.
The signature is s = (c, π).
Verification: To verify signature s check the proof π Theorem 15 The signature scheme described above is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack.
Proof. Let A Sign sk (·) (vk) be an adversary with access to a signing oracle and a randomly generated verification key vk. We wish to argue that it has negligible probability of finding a valid signature on a message m that it has not queried the oracle. Observe first that by the soundness of the NIZK proof and the decryption verifiability property the ciphertext in A's forgery must contain m, b so V (a, b ) = 1. We can therefore modify the game such that we decrypt the resulting ciphertext in A's forgery and consider the adversary unsuccessful if such m, b is not the plaintext.
Let us modify the game such that we create (σ, τ ) ← S 1 (1 k ) and simulate the NIZK proofs in the signing oracle. By the unbounded zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof, the adversary cannot distinguish between this game and the previous one, so the success probability is changed negligibly. In particular, it must still produce a forgery where the plaintext is m, b to be successful.
Let us make another modification, instead of encrypting m, b when making signatures, we encrypt m, 1. To argue that this does not change the success probability of the adversary we will make a hybrid argument, so let Sign[i] sk (·) be an oracle that on queries 1, . . . , q responds with a signature where it encrypts m j , 1 on a query m j , where j < i and encrypts m j , b if j ≥ i. Let q(k) be an upper bound on the number of signing queries A makes. Since A is a polynomial time adversary, q(k) is polynomial. We now have Sign sk (·) =Sign[0] sk (·), and we are switching to use the signing oracle Sign[q(k)] sk (·) where we encrypt (·, 1).
What we need to observe is that for all 0 ≤ i < q(k) the adversary's success probability using oracle Sign[i] sk (·) is almost the same as when using the oracle Sign[i + 1] sk (·). Let us see that RCCAsecurity of the cryptosystem implies this property. Given a public key pk for the RCCA-security we choose (a, b) ← K gap (1 k ) and we choose (σ, τ ) ← S 1 (1 k ) and give the adversary the verification key vk = (pk, a, σ). We answer queries 1, . . . , i − 1 by encrypting m j , 1 and simulating π. Now A produces query m i and we let our two challenge messages be m 0 = (m i , 1) and m 1 = (m i , b) . We receive a challenge encryption of one of these messages, and our goal is to break RCCA-security by distinguishing which one we received. We answer query i by simulating the proof and returning the challenge ciphertext together with the simulated proof. In all future signing queries, we encrypt (m j , b) and simulate the proofs. Notice, if the challenge encryption has the plaintext m i , 1, then this corresponds exactly to the adversary running with oracle Sign[i] sk , while if the challenge encryption has plaintext m i , b, then it corresponds exactly to the adversary running with oracle Sign[i + 1] sk . The adversary now produces a forged signature c, π on message m. We give c to the decryption oracle and receive a response m , b . In case m = m, V gap (a, b ) = 1 we output 1, else we output 0. In case the response is test we also output 0. By definition, to be successful A had to produce a ciphertext where m was inside (i.e., it is never successful if the answer is test) and V gap (a, b ) = 1. Therefore, if A has more than negligible difference in success probability with respectively oracle Sign[i] sk and Sign[i + 1] sk , then we can break the RCCA-security of the cryptosystem.
To conclude, observe that now we have a game where the adversary sees encryptions of m i , 1 on query i, yet to be successful has to produce an encryption of m, b such that V gap (a, b ) = 1. Since (a, b) is a gap problem, the adversary has negligible success probability.
We can instantiate the general signature scheme above using a DLIN group. The gap problem will be the following: We pick d at random and let
It is straightforward to verify the correctness of such a pair by checking whether e(g, b) = e(a, a). Lemma 16 states that given a it is hard to compute b.
Lemma 16 If the DLIN assumption holds for G then for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have
Proof. If we can solve the computational Diffie-Hellman problem with more than negligible probability then we can break DLIN. In other words, given g, g α , g β for random α, β ← Z p it is hard to compute g αβ . Assume that we have more than negligible chance of computing g d 2 in the game above. This means, given g α , g β we have more than negligible chance of computing g (α+β) 2 , g (α−β) 2 . Rewriting g αβ = g ((α+beta) 2 −(α−β) 2 )4 −1 we see that this violates the hardness of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
To make a signature on m = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ G n we encrypt m 1 , . . . , m n , b with the RCCA-secure cryptosystem constructed in the previous section. This encryption consists of O(n) group elements.
We need to make an NIZK proof that indeed the ciphertext contains the correct m 1 , . . . , m n and b such that e(g, b) = e(a, a). Recall from the last section that the RCCA-secure encryption contains as a part of it a CPA-secure ciphertext c 1 which encrypts m 1 , . . . , m n , b as , g r 1,n+1 +s 1,n+1 b). If the ciphertext is valid, which is publicly verifiable, the decryption operation gives us m 1 , . . . , m n , b. The RCCA-secure cryptosystem therefore has simple decryption verification where the witness is on the form g r 1 , . . . , g r n+1 . All we have to do now is to check whether indeed e(a, a) = e(g, b). All equations we have to evaluate are pairing product equations. This means that we can build an NIZK proof for R encgap of length O(n).
Corollary 17
Under the DLIN assumption there exists a CMA-secure digital signature scheme (K sign , Sign, Ver) for signing n group elements with perfect correctness. The verification key and the signatures consist of O(n) group elements and the verification process consists of evaluating a set of pairing product equations.
Strong One-Time Signature
The idea for our strong one-time signature scheme is to set up a Pedersen trapdoor commitment to 0. When we receive a message m ∈ Z p to be signed, we make a trapdoor opening of the commitment to m. Only the signer knows the trapdoor, so only he can sign messages. Security of this scheme comes from the hardness of computing discrete logarithms. Note, the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem is implied by the DLIN assumption.
We want the signature scheme to be secure against a one-time chosen message attack. Therefore, we set up the Pedersen commitment with two trapdoors such that it is impossible for the adversary to see which trapdoor we used. This way, if the adversary can forge a signature we can find a way to break one of the trapdoors, i.e., compute a discrete logarithm.
Key generation:
On the bilinear group (p, G, G 1 , e, g) we generate the verification key and the signing key, as follows. We choose x s , y s ← Z * p and set f s = g xs , h s = g ys . We pick r s , s s ← Z p and set c s = f rs s h ss s . We pick a collision-free hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p . The verification key is vk = (p, G, G 1 , e, g, f s , h s , c s , H) and the secret key is sk = (vk, x s , y s ).
Signature:
To sign a message m ∈ {0, 1} * pick r ← Z p and reveal the signature (r, (x s (r s − r) + y s s s − H(m))/y s ).
Verification:
To verify a signature (r, s) on m we check that c s = g H(m) f r s h s s .
Theorem 18
Assuming hardness of computing discrete logarithms and collision-freeness of the hashfunction, the protocol (K sots , Sign, Ver) described above is a strong one-time signature scheme for signing messages m ∈ {0, 1} * with perfect correctness.
Proof. Let us say the adversary A queries for a signature (r, s) on m and then forges a signature (r , s ) on m , where s = s with more than negligible probability. We will use it to compute a discrete logarithm or break the collision-freeness of the hash-function. Let h s = g ys be a challenge for the DL problem, we wish to compute y s so h s = g ys . We choose x s ← Z * p (we can also easily check that y s = 0) and let f s = g xs . We then form c s = f rs s h s for r s , s ← Z p . On query m we return the signature (r, s) = (r s − H(m)/x s , s). This looks exactly like a real verification key and a standard signature. A therefore produces a forgery m , (r , s ) with s = s with more than negligible probability. We see now that c = g H (m)f r s h s s = g H(m ) f r s h s s and therefore h s = g (H(m )+xsr −H(m)−xsr)/(s−s ) , so we have computed the discrete logarithm of h s . In a similar fashion, we can argue that A must reuse r = r. But if r = r, s = s the only possibility is H(m ) = H(m) and A has found a collision if m = m.
Since hardness of computing discrete logarithms implies the existence of collision-free hash-functions this is not really an extra assumption.
Simulation-Sound NIZK Proof of Knowledge for Satisfiability of Pairing Product Equations
In this section, we combine the tools of the previous section with the NIZK proofs to construct an unbounded simulation-sound extractable NIZK proof for satisfiability of pairing product equations. We first describe the idea in general terms of proving a statement x belongs to some language L. The prover will pick random keys (vk sots , sk sots ) for a strong one-time signature scheme, and vk sots will be part of the NIZK proof. Another part of the NIZK proof will be a strong one-time signature on the statement to be proven and the NIZK proof. Since the adversary does not know the secret signing key associated with vk sots he must pick a different verification key in his forged NIZK proof.
The common reference string will contain a verification key vk for a digital signature scheme that is secure against adaptive chosen message attack. The prover will prove that x ∈ L or that he knows a signature on vk sots . In simulations we can set it up such that we do know the secret signing key associated with vk. This allows us to sign any vk sots and therefore make a convincing NIZK proof even though we do not know a witness for x ∈ L. On the other hand, the adversary even after seeing many such proofs will not be able to forge a signature on a new vk sots and therefore he cannot make a valid NIZK proof for a false statement.
Obviously, we need to hide the digital signature on vk sots , otherwise it would be easy to see whether an NIZK proof was real or simulated. To do this, we let the common reference string contain a public key for a CPA-secure cryptosystem. In a real proof we encrypt some dummy message, while in the simulation we encrypt a digital signature on vk sots . We then proceed with an NIZK proof that x ∈ L or the ciphertext contains a signature on vk sots .
One small issue remains. A computationally unbounded adversary can of course forge signatures under vk and therefore prove false statements. To have perfect soundness, we will include an encryption c 1 of some non-trivial element in the common reference string. Furthermore, in the NIZK proofs we require an NIZK proof for the prover having both encrypted a digital signature on vk sots as well as c 1 having plaintext 1. Since c 1 does not have plaintext 1 even an unbounded prover cannot cheat. On the other hand, in the simulation we will set up c 1 so that it does contain 1.
To make the NIZK proof a proof of knowledge, instead of proving directly that x ∈ L, we will encrypt a witness and prove that we have encrypted the witness, or we have encrypted a signature on vk sots and c 1 has 1 as plaintext.
Let in the following (K, P ssor , V ssor , S 1 , S ssor ) be an NIZK proof for R ssor , the relation for the statement that c w contains a satisfying (a 1 , . . . , a n ) or c s contains a signature on vk sots and c 1 contains 1.
More formally, R ssor = {((S, c w , c s ), w) | (w = (a 1 , . . . , a n , R w ) : c = E (fe,he) (a 1 , . . . , a n ; R w ), S(a 1 , . . . , a n ) = true) ∨ (w = (s, R s , r c , s c ) : c s = E (fe,he) (s; R s ), Ver vk (vk sots , s) = 1, c 1 = E (fe,he) (1; r c , s c ))}.
Common reference string generation and simulation: On group (p, G, G 1 , e, g) do
The common reference string is Σ = (vk, f e , h e , c 1 , σ)
The extraction algorithm E 1 generates the common reference string as above and outputs the extraction key ξ = (x e , y e ) Perfect completeness: It follows from the perfect completeness of the NIZK proof for R ppsat that we get perfectly complete NIZK proof for R ssor . This combined with the perfect decryption property of the cryptosystem and the perfect correctness of the signature schemes gives us perfect completeness.
Perfect soundness and perfect knowledge extraction: From the perfect soundness of the NIZK proof for R ssor we know that either c w encrypts a satisfying (a 1 , . . . , a n ) or that c 1 is an encryption of 1. Since c 1 is not an encryption of 1 this means that c w encrypts a satisfying a 1 , . . . , a n . This implies that S is satisfiable. Moreover, given the decryption key (x e , y e ) we can extract the witness (a 1 , . . . , a n ) = D (xe,ye) (c w ).
Composable zero-knowledge:
We first have to argue common reference string indistinguishability. The only difference between common reference strings and simulated common reference strings is whether c 1 is an encryption of 1 or not. By the semantic security of the cryptosystem no nonuniform polynomial time adversary can distinguish between such ciphertexts with more than negligible probability, and therefore it cannot distinguish between real and simulated common reference strings.
Let now Σ be a simulated common reference string and consider a non-uniform polynomial time adversary A(Σ, τ ) that tries to distinguish between proofs and simulated proofs. It produces a set S of pairing product equations as well as a satisfiability witness (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Given a proof π it has to distinguish whether π was simulated or not.
Let us start with the way the prover creates a proof π. By the semantic security of the cryptosystem, we can create a signature s ← Sign sk (vk sots ) and let c s = E (fe,he) (s; R s ) instead of encrypting 1's without changing A's success probability more than negligibly.
The proof π ssor proves that c w contains a satisfying (a 1 , . . . , a n ), or c 1 encrypts 1 and c s contains a signature on vk sots . Now both parts of this or-statement is true and we know a witness for both of them. Since π ssor is a zero-knowledge proof it is also witness-indistinguishable. We can therefore switch to using the witness (s, R s , r c , s c ) in the proof π ssor without A detecting the switch.
By the semantic security of the cryptosystem A does not notice it if we switch to creating c w as an encryption of (1, . . . , 1). We are now creating the proof as the simulator does, but A's success probability has changed only negligibly.
Simulation-sound extractability:
We will argue that it is infeasible for a non-uniform polynomial time adversary A S 2 (Σ,τ,·) (Σ, ξ) to create a statement and valid proof (x, π) such that we cannot extract a witness from it, unless π is one of the query-responses.
We first observe that the strong one-time signature scheme's existential unforgeability implies that it is infeasible for A to produce a valid proof π where it recycles vk sots from one of the queries.
If c w does not contain a satisfying (a 1 , . . . , a n ) then by the soundness of the NIZK proof for R ssor the ciphertext c s must contain a signature s on vk sots . Using the decryption key (x e , y e ) we therefore obtain a forged signature under vk. By the CMA-security of the signature scheme this event has negligible probability of happening.
Universally Composable Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge
The goal of this section is to demonstrate how powerful NIZK proofs with simulation-sound extractability are. We will securely realize the NIZK-functionality F NIZK from [GOS06b] in Canetti's UC framework [Can01] . In [GOS06b] there is a construction of a UC NIZK protocol that can be used to realize F NIZK for Circuit Satisfiability in a model where the adversary is adaptive and the parties cannot erase data from their tapes. We consider a weaker model, where the parties can erase data from their tapes. On the other hand, whereas the UC NIZK protocol in [GOS06b] is inefficient, our protocol produces proofs of linear size in the circuit size. We note that [CLOS02] have already observed without proof that simulation-sound extractability gives you UC NIZK for non-adaptive adversaries, which in the case of UC NIZK is almost the same as adaptive adversaries where we allow erasures.
MODELING NON-INTERACTIVE ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS We refer to [Can01, GOS06b] for a description of the UC-framework and the modeling of NIZK proofs/arguments in the UC framework. Here we simply describe the ideal functionalities for Circuit Satisfiability and prove that we can realize it with linear size proofs under the DLIN assumption for G.
Parametrized by relation R and running with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and adversary S.
Proof: On input (prove,sid, ssid, x, w) from party P ignore if (x, w) / ∈ R. Send (prove,x) to S and wait for answer (proof, π). Upon receiving the answer store (x, π) and send (proof, sid, ssid, π) to P .
Verification:
On input (verify, sid, ssid, x, π) from V check whether (x, π) is stored. If not send (verify,x, π) to S and wait for an answer (witness,w). Upon receiving the answer, check whether (x, w) ∈ R and in that case, store (x, π). If (x, π) has been stored return (verification,sid, ssid,1) to V , else return (verification,sid, ssid,0). Proof: Party P waits until receiving (crs,sid, Σ) from F CRS .
On input (prove,sid, ssid, x, w) run π ← P (Σ, x, w). Erase intermediate data used in the computation of π. Output (proof,sid, ssid, π).
Verification: Party V waits until receiving (crs,sid, Σ) from F CRS .
On input (verify,sid, ssid, x, π) run b ← V (Σ, x, π). Output (verification,sid, ssid, b).
Figure 5:
Protocol for UC NIZK proof using simulation-sound extractable NIZK proof (K, P, V, S 1 , S 2 , E 1 , E 2 , SE 1 ) for relation R.
Theorem 20
The protocol in Figure 5 securely realizes F NIZK in the F CRS -model. Proof. Let A be a non-uniform polynomial time adversary. We will describe an ideal adversary S so no non-uniform polynomial time environment can distinguish whether it is running in the F CRS -hybrid model with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and adversary A or in the ideal process with F NIZK , S and dummy parties P 1 , . . . ,P n .
S starts by invoking a copy of A. It will run a simulated interaction of A, the parties and the environment. In particular, whenever the simulated A communicates with the environment, S just passes this information along. And whenever A corrupts a party P i , S corrupts the corresponding dummy partyP i . SIMULATING F CRS . S chooses the common reference string as (Σ, τ, ξ) ← SE 1 (1 k ). S simulates F CRS sending (crs,sid, Σ) to all parties. Whenever A decides to deliver such a message to a party P i , S will simulate P i receiving this string. SIMULATING UNCORRUPTED PROVERS. Suppose S receives (proof,sid, ssid, x) from F NIZK . This means that some dummy partyP received input (prove,sid, ssid, x, w), where (x, w) ∈ R. We must simulate the output a real party P would make, however, we may not know w.
We create π ← S 2 (Σ, τ, x) and return (proof,π) to F NIZK . F NIZK subsequently sends (proof,sid, ssid, π) toP and we deliver this message so it gets output to the environment. SIMULATING UNCORRUPTED VERIFIERS. Suppose S receives (verify,x, π) from F NIZK . This means an honest dummy partyṼ has received (verify,sid, ssid, x, π) from the environment.
S checks the proof, b ← V (Σ, x, π). If invalid, it sends (witness,no witness) to F NIZK and delivers the consequent message (verification,sid, ssid, 0) toṼ that outputs this rejection to the environment.
On the other hand, if the UC NIZK argument is valid we must try to extract a witness w. If x has ever been proved by an honest prover that was later corrupted, we will know the witness and do not need to run the following extraction procedure. If the witness is not known already S lets w ← E 2 (Σ, ξ, x, π). If (x, w) / ∈ R it sets w = no witness. It sends (witness,w) to F NIZK . It delivers the resulting output message toṼ that outputs it to the environment.
We will later argue that the probability of the proof being valid, yet us not being able to supply a good witness to F NIZK is negligible. That means with overwhelming probability we input a valid witness w to F NIZK when π is an acceptable UC NIZK argument for x.
SIMULATING CORRUPTION. Suppose a simulated party P i is corrupted by A. Then we have to simulate the transcript of P i . We start by corruptingP i thereby learning all UC NIZK arguments it has verified. It is straightforward to simulate P i 's internal tapes when running these verification processes.
We also learn all statements x that it has proved together with the corresponding witnesses w. Recall, the UC NIZK arguments π have been provided by S. Since we erased all other data, we can therefore simulate the tape of P i .
HYBRIDS. We wish to argue that no environment can distinguish between the adversary A running with parties executing the UC NIZK protocol in the F CRS -hybrid model and the ideal adversary S running in the F NIZK -hybrid model with dummy parties. In order to do so we define several hybrid experiments and show that the environment cannot distinguish between any of them.
H0: This is the F CRS -hybrid model running with adversary A and parties P 1 , . . . , P n .
H1:
We modify H0 by running (Σ, τ, ξ) ← SE 1 (1 k ) and creating the proofs of uncorrupted provers as π ← S 2 (Σ, τ, x).
By the unbounded zero-knowledge property the adversary this experiment is indistinguishable from H0.
H2:
Consider the case where an honest party V receives (verify,sid, ssid, x, π). Suppose π is indeed an acceptable UC NIZK proof and π is not one of the proofs we simulated. We run w ← E 2 (Σ, ξ, x, π).
If (x, w) / ∈ R give up in the simulation.
By the simulation-sound extractability property there is negligible probability that we will ever give up, so H2 is indistinguishable from H1.
H3: This is the ideal process running with F NIZK and S.
Inspection shows that in process H2 and H3 we are computing the different parts of the protocol in the same way. H2 and H3 are therefore perfectly indistinguishable to the environment. In a group signature scheme there is a group manager that controls the group. This group manager controls who can join the group. Once in the group members can sign messages on behalf of the group. Members' signatures are anonymous except to the group manager who can open a signature and see who signed the message. In some scenarios it is of interest to separate the group manager into two entities, an issuer who enrolls members and an opener who traces signers. We will describe the algorithms the group signature scheme will support. We imagine that there is a PKI in place so that public keys can be trusted. We model this by having a public key registry reg where only user i has a one-time write access to reg[i], we do not attempt to keep this information secret. User i's stores his secret key in gsk[i], unless compromised only the user has access to this key. [BSZ05] model the PKI in a slightly more complicated way, but the difference between their definition and the present one is non-essential.
Key generation:
GKg generates (gpk, ik, ok). Here gpk is a group public key, while ik and ok are respectively the issuer's and the opener's secret key. The [BSZ05] definition allows for many rounds of secret communication. Our protocol is secure in this more restricted model where we have a simple 2-move interaction, which does not need to be secret.
Sign:
A group member i can sign a message m by running picking randomness r and letting the signature be s = Gsig(gpk, gsk[i], m; r).
Verify:
To verify a signature s on message m we run GVf(gpk, m, s). The signature is valid if and only if this verification algorithm outputs 1.
Open:
The opener has read-access to the registration table reg.
We have (i, ψ) ← Open(gpk, ok, reg, m, s) gives an opening of a valid signature s on message m pointing to i. In case the signature points to no member, the opener will assume the issuer forged the signature and set i = issuer.
Judge: This algorithm is used to verify that openings are correct. We say the opening is correct if Judge(gpk, i, reg[i], m, s, ψ) = 1.
Group Signature Security Definitions
[BSZ05] define four security properties that the group signature must satisfy: correctness, anonymity, traceability and non-frameability. We refer to [BSZ05] for a discussion how this security definition covers and strengthens other security issues that have appeared in the literature.
PERFECT CORRECTNESS. On any adversarially chosen message, the verification should accept a group signature created with a correctly generated group signing key gsk[i] for member i. Running the opening algorithm on this should identify i and make the Judge algorithm accept the opening. For all (unbounded) adversaries A we have ANONYMITY. It should be infeasible for an adversary to identify the signer of a message if he does not know the opener's key ok. We require a strong sense of anonymity, which holds even when the adversary controls the issuer and that all the members' secret signing keys are exposed. We require for all nonuniform polynomial time A that Open: On input (m, s) that has not been produced by Ch b return Open(gpk, ok, reg, m, s).
ReadGsk:
On input i return gsk [i] . Add i to the query list Q ReadGsk .
TRACEABILITY. We want to avoid forged group signatures. The issuer can always make a dummy registration and create group signatures, so we cannot rule out the creation of group signatures. What we want
We start with the Ch 0 oracle and modify it such that we run SE 1 in the key generation algorithm to get Σ. In the challenge, we simulate the NIZK proof π for c encrypting (vk i 0 , cert i 0 , s i 0 ). By the unbounded zero-knowledge of the NIZK proof the adversary's success probability changes negligibly.
Next, let us observe that the probability of reusing vk sots as the verification key for the one-time signature in any valid query to the opening oracle is negligible since it is a strong one-time signature scheme. We can therefore from now on assume that does not happen.
This implies that the statement (vk, pk, vk sots , c) that is proved in the group signature in any query to the opening oracle is different from the statement in the challenge signature. Therefore, instead of using the opener's key ok to extract the plaintext (vk i , cert i , s i ) we may as well use the knowledge extractor for the NIZK proof. By the simulation-sound extraction property this gives the right opening with overwhelming probability.
Since we are not decrypting any ciphertexts any more, we can use the semantic security to argue that the adversary's success probability is the same when we change the ciphertext in the challenge to encrypt (1, . . . , 1) instead of (vk i 0 , cert i 0 , s i 0 ).
By a similar argument, we can argue that the game where the adversary has access to Ch 1 gives him similar success probability when seeing a challenge consisting of c = E pk (1, . . . , 1) and a simulated proof π.
Traceability:
We want a guarantee that if the issuer is honest, then every signature can be traced back to a member. Consider a valid group signature s = (vk sots , c, π, s sots ) on m. By the perfect soundness of the proof π we know that c contains a plaintext (vk * , cert * , s * ), where Ver vk (vk * , cert * ) = 1.
The opening points to i that has registered vk * , unless no such registration took place. However, if no such registration took place, then the issuer never signed vk * . This implies that we have created a forged signature on vk * and therefore broken the CMA-security of the signature scheme.
Non-frameability:
In this definition, both the issuer and the opener are corrupt. We want to guarantee that no uncorrupt member is framed. Consider an adversary that creates a valid signature (vk sots , c, π, s sots ) on m and a valid opening (i, (vk i , cert * , s * ) pointing to i. In all group signatures s this member made, it generated a signature s sots using a random key pair (vk sots , sk sots ). By the strong unforgeability the adversary cannot recycle vk sots . Therefore, the adversary must have chosen a new vk sots that has never been signed by member i. This means s * is a forged signature on vk sots and we have broken the CMA-security of the signature scheme.
KEY GENERATION. The security definitions in [BMW03, BSZ05] rely on a trusted key generation. Their security guarantees guard against key exposures, but not against a malicious key generator. Let us consider which parts need to be trusted. Security for all parties rely on (p, G, G 1 , e, g) being a DLIN group. Assuming that it is a DLIN group we get non-frameability even if the issuer and opener cooperate to generate the rest of the group public key gpk.
The opener is in control of the anonymity, if it is corrupt there is no anonymity. We can therefore assume that the opener will try to help members get anonymity. One of the components in giving anonymity is the CPA-security of the cryptosystem. It is therefore reasonable to let the opener generate pk and in the process learn the corresponding decryption key ok. Another part is the zero-knowledge property and the simulation-sound extractability of the NIZK proof. We can let the opener generate the common reference string Σ.
The issuer can create arbitrary group signatures on its own. If it is dishonest we cannot protect ourselves against forgeries. Therefore, it is reasonable to let it aid us in guaranteeing traceability. One part of this is to let it generate (vk, ik) such that certificates cannot be forged. Another part of this is to let it verify that the opener knows the secret key corresponding to pk and has generated Σ so it is indeed perfectly sound. The issuer can for instance request an interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge from the opener to get these guarantees.
We conclude that the trust in the key generation algorithm boils down to trust in the DLIN problem being hard in the group (p, G, G 1 , e, g ).
